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activities," taking vast tracts of land under
their real political control. 9 Adolescents
involved in these gangs fall, in every
sense, within one of the four images
Drumbl promotes for reimagining child
soldiers. One major six-country study
provides disturbing and extensive evidence on the rise of violent international
gangs that heavily recruit children.6 0 The
authors of this study formed a coalition
calling itself COAV, or Children and Youth
in Organized Violence." The etymology
of the group is itself recognition of the
proximity between international gangs
and child soldiers. This adopted terminology is remarkably close to that used by
the international community who identify
child soldiers more precisely as children
associated with armed forces or armed

groups. Perhaps we all would benefit
from closer study of the growing merger
of these dangerous and precarious worlds
where childhood is survival, not joy.
Richard J.Wilson*
Washington College of Law
Richard ]. Wilson is Professor of Law and
founding director of the International Human
*

Rights Law Clinic at the Washington College

of Law, American University, in Washington,
DC, where he has taught since 1989. He has
been a visiting professor at law schools in
the Netherlands, Japan, and Peru, a Fulbright
Scholar in Colombia, and during spring semester, 2010, he was the Tillar House Fellow
at the American Society of International Law.
His litigation work includes representation of
Omar Khadr and other detainees at Guanti-

namo Bay, Cuba in federal courts and military
commissions; several US capital cases at the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights;
three cases in the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights; and counsel for the European
Union in friend-of-court briefs in the US Supreme Court, cited by the majority in striking
down the death penalty in Atkins v. Virginia
(2002) (persons with mental retardation), and
Roper v. Simmons (2005) (juveniles under

eighteen).

Johannes Morsink, Inherent Human
Rights: Philosophical Roots of the
Universal Declaration, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press 2009), 319 pages, ISBN 9780-8122-4162.
Johannes Morsink has written an impassioned defense of viewing today's human
rights as direct descendents of the Enlightenment conception of natural rights.
According to this conception, "human
rights are inherent in all human beings
who have or possess them from birth."'
It holds that people are born with a protected moral status that is not a human
construct and that cannot be taken away.
Morsink argues not just that this sort of
view was common among the authors
of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR), but also that we ought
to believe it today.
The first two chapters of the book set
out Morsink's views on inherent rights
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and how people can know them. Chapters three and four switch from metaphysics and epistemology to normative
ethics; they explain the shortcomings of
the Golden Rule as a basis for human
rights and defend Martha Nussbaum's
capabilities approach to human rights.
Chapter five defends human rights against
a charge of "unrealistic utopianism" and
chapter six concludes with a defense of
democratic participation as a key part of
the "organic tapestry of human rights."'
There are several reasons to welcome
Morsink's defense of the Enlightenment
view of human rights. One is that it will
stimulate readers to rethink whether and
to what extent they can reclaim such
a view for themselves today. Another
is that it provides a clear version of a
philosophical view that many people
hold and that philosophers and political
theorists should and surely will continue
to teach as one possible account of how
human rights exist. Although Morsink
does not appeal to religion in explaining
or justifying human rights, the idea that
human rights are inherent will resonate
with religious people who would explain
these rights as the result of divine decree,
and our knowledge of them as deriving
at least partly it being written in our
consciences by our creator.
Morsink's first book, The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights: Origins,
Drafting, and Intent,3 is an excellent

history of the deliberations leading to
the drafting of the UDHR. It showed the
very large role that the experience of the
Holocaust and other horrors of World
War II had on the content of the UDHR.

2.
3.

Much material from this earlier work
reappears in this book. By my lights this
material is used excessively and is often
distracting. In the middle of discussing
"classical moral intuitionism," for example, we suddenly find a substantial
section discussing the UDHR drafting
debates.4 Morsink's conclusions are not
supported by this material. The fact that
many of the drafters of the UDHR held a
particular human rights philosophy in no
way commits us today to that philosophy.
Those drafters have no special philosophical authority. We are free to try to find
ways of endorsing or criticizing human
rights that fit our own worldviews and
philosophical commitments.
Although Morsink insists that human
rights are inherent, he gives up on the
idea that we can specify one or more
properties such as agency, rationality, selfconsciousness, or experiencing pleasure
and pain as the grounds of human rights
or the properties on which the normative status supervenes. Morsink has two
reasons for giving up on this idea. One
is a worry about "essentialism," about
committing oneself to some fixed human
essence.s The other is a practical worry: if
we say that rights inhere in some feature
of humans then people who arguably lack
that feature will lack rights.' I doubt that
abandoning the idea that human rights
are rooted in the possession of one or
more of these characteristics is a good
move. If one is going to defend the idea
that rights are somehow inherent in all
humans one will be better able to do so
if one can say something about what it
is about humans that makes them wor-
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thy of rights. Surely the fact that people
are capable of self-consciously leading
their lives, of choosing their own course
and shaping their own characters, has
something to do with their having inherent rights.
Morsink's targets are not mainly
theorists who totally reject moral human
rights, but rather theorists like Charles Beitz, Michael Ignatieff, Thomas Pogge, and
John Rawls who either give a pragmatic
justification for human rights or attempt
to derive them from some deeper conception of justice or equality. In the current
jargon, Morsink defends a "moral" or
"humanistic" conception of human rights
while the theorists just mentioned defend
a "political" conception. In his discussion of the transition from the language
of natural rights to the language of human
rights, Morsink welcomes this change
in how we talk about inherent rights
but accuses Pogge of throwing out "the
baby of inherence with the bathwater of
natural rights."'
For someone who gives great emphasis to the metaphysical commitments that
he finds in the UDHR, Morsink does not
really get into the metaphysics of moral
realism in any detail or discuss whether
they can find a place within secular and
naturalistic world views. 9 What he says is
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that "there exists in the world a realm of
objective moral values""o and that moral
truth is "objective.""
Morsink holds that all normal humans
have the "epistemic equipment" needed
to recognize that people all have rights. 2
We can enter the realm of objective moral
values through our "moral sentiments"13
and "our shared moral sense, faculty,

or conscience." 14 Moral intuitionism is

currently enjoying a renaissance within
the epistemology of ethics, but Morsink
does not draw on the work of contemporary intuitionists such as Robert Audi
and Michael Huemer.15 W. D. Ross isthe
only intuitionist he cites.
Oddly, Morsink combines his moral
intuitionism with the idea that our knowledge of moral human rights comes from
experiencing or learning about great
injustices: "We must first be introduced
to them by someone or some situation
(such as a gross violation of human dignity), but once that introduction has taken
place, our moral sense often speaks with
a single and clear voice."1 6 A better role
for learning about great injustices, Ithink,
would be to help us to identify specific
human rights that are worth identifying,
advocating, and protecting through law.
Following John Locke and Thomas Jefferson, one might think of moral intuitionism

On this contrast see Pablo Gilabert, Humanist and Political Perspectives on Human
Rights, 39 PoL. THEORY439 (2011).
MORSINK, INHERENTHUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 24.
On moral realism see Geoff Sayre-McCord, Moral Realism, in THE STANFORDENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHILOSOPHY
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2011), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
sum201 1/entries/moral-realism/, and the bibliography therein.
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as yielding abstract moral principles or
rights and then use the experience of injustices to guide the derivation of specific
moral and legal human rights from-these
abstract principles."
According to Morsink, believing that
human rights are inherent has some
good consequences for human rights
practice. One is that it will help us resist
downsized lists of human rights such as
those offered by Ignatieff " and Rawls.19
Another is that it will help us resist the
sorts of easy trade-offs that a utilitarian
view of rights might permit: "A commitment to inherence can be of enormous
help in various implementation battles
where computations of the public welfare
are matched against the notion of inherent rights."2 0
As I understand him, Morsink offers three main reasons why we should
believe that human rights are inherent.
First, many of the authors of the UDHR
believed this. Second, human rights
documents and treaties continue to use
language suggesting that humans are
born free and equal and are endowed
with reason and conscience. Third, the
international human rights project will
go better if those who work with human
rights as activists, lawyers, and diplomats
have beliefs of this sort. All of these strike
me as very weak reasons for thinking that
a philosophical view of human rights is
worthy of belief.
James W. Nickel*
University of Miami
* James W. Nickel teaches and writes in human rights law and theory, jurisprudence,
and political philosophy. He is the author of
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Making Sense of Human Rights (2d ed. 2007)
and more than seventy articles in philosophy
and law. Nickel has ajoint appointment in Philosophy and Law at the University of Miami.

Galit A. Sarfaty, Values in Transla-

tion: Human Rights and the Culture
of the World Bank (Stanford University Press 2012), 200 pages, ISBN
978 0 8047 6352 3.
In Values in Translation: Human Rights
and the Culture of the World Bank,

Galit Sarfaty, an assistant professor at the
University of British Columbia, brings a
unique perspective combining anthropology and law to the study of one of the
world's most prominent international
organizations. Sarfaty explains why the
World Bank remains reluctant to integrate
human rights considerations into lending
practices. Sarfaty's consideration of the
political, legal, and bureaucratic barriers
to the Bank's adoption of a human rights
policy is an insightful critique and provides much needed guidance for reform.
The main problem Sarfaty addresses
is that, despite the Bank adopting various
social and environmental policies, an
overarching operational policy on human
rights remains absent. Although the Bank
engages in human rights rhetoric, it fails
to include human rights concerns systematically in its decisions concerning lending. Any consideration of human rights is
ad hoc and many employees consider it
taboo to discuss human rights in everyday conversation or project documents.
Specifically, the Bank resists adopting
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